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This paper combines insights from different streams of literature to develop a more 
comprehensive framework for the analysis of technology transfer via value chain relationships. 
We integrate the existing literature in three ways. First, we consider value chain relationships as a 
multi-facet process of interaction between buyers and suppliers, involving different degrees of 
knowledge transmission and development. Second, we assess whether and to what extent value 
chain relationships are associated with the presence of multinationals and with their 
embeddedness in the host economy. Third, we take into account the capabilities of local firms to 
handle the technology as a factor influencing knowledge transfer through value chain 
relationships. Using data on 1385 firms active in Thailand in 2001-2003, we apply a multinomial 
logit model to test how the nature and intensity of multinational presence and the competencies of 
local firms affect the organisation of  international technology transfer. We find that knowledge 
intensive relationships, which are characterized by a significant transmission of technology along 
the value chains, are positively associated with the presence of global buyers in the local market, 
with the efforts of MNCs to adapt technology to local contexts, and with the technical capabilities 
of domestic firms. By contrast, the age of subsidiaries and the share of inputs purchased locally 
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Multinational firms are widely considered as crucial actors in technology transfer to local firms, 
especially when Less Developed Countries are considered as recipient economies. Relationships 
with suppliers are key channels in this perspective. Using a jargon increasingly adopted in the 
literature, we shall identify these vertical relationships with the term “value chain relationships” 
(or “Value chain governance modes”), through which production processes are organized on a 
global scale (Sturgeon 2001). The development of such organizational arrangements goes hand in 
hand with significant knowledge flows. Some knowledge transfer occurs involuntarily through 
imitation of the technological and managerial practices of global buyers. Important knowledge 
assets are also transferred voluntarily by multinationals in their efforts to increase the efficiency 
of their local suppliers (and to obtain access to local competencies on a reciprocity basis). 
However, not all value chain relationships are equally conducive to knowledge transfer. In this 
paper we analyze under which circumstances local firms get involved in knowledge intensive 
value chain relationships. 
 
Different streams of literature provide complementary insights on factors enhancing technology 
transfer through global value chain relationships. Among other strands of contributions, 
international production literature has emphasized a number of characteristics of both foreign and 
domestic firms which may favor vertical linkages, technology transfer and productivity 
spillovers. On the one hand, several features of foreign firms have been highlighted, including the 
intensity of their presence in a given market and their degree of embeddedness in local contexts. 
On the other hand, local skill endowment and ability to handle knowledge is also stressed as a 
fundamental condition making it advantageous for foreign firms to engage in technology transfer, 
and for domestic firms to gain access to foreign knowledge. While this stream of literature 
highlights the importance of linkage creation in the transfer of technology, the main focus 
remains on the international organization of production taking place within the boundaries of 
multinational firms. As a result, most of these contributions largely disregard the extreme variety 
of value chain relationships in which multinationals are involved.   
 
From a different perspective and with a lesser focus on multinational enterprises, recent 
developments in the “Global value chain” literature have drawn attention to the variety of  value 
chain relationships wherein global buyers interact with local suppliers in different countries. 
Alternative relationships (governance modes) will emerge in the presence of different degrees of 
standardization of products and processes, and of different competencies of suppliers. As we shall 
highlight in reviewing this literature, the mode of governance is essential for understanding 
whether and how firms in developing countries can gain access to global markets, and benefit 
from them. However, this line of research places no particular emphasis on the characteristics of 
buyers, apart from their being global in nature. As opposed to works on the economics of 
international production, and quite symmetrically, global value chain literature has the merit of 
exploring the heterogeneity of governance modes but it neglects structural and behavioral 
differences across global buyers. 
 
Combining insights from these two streams of literature, we develop a more comprehensive 
analytical framework to evaluate the choice of alternative modes of organizing technology 
transfer from global buyers to local suppliers. We shall follow five steps. First, we shall identify a   3
wider range of  value chain agreements than is usually the case in contributions on multinational 
firms and international production. Second, we shall allow for a greater heterogeneity of global 
buyers than is commonly done in the global value chain literature. Third, we shall take account of 
competencies of local firms as emphasized by both streams of research. Fourth, we shall argue 
that the characteristics of both foreign and domestic firms affect the choice of value chain 
governance modes. Fifth, and finally, we shall apply this more comprehensive analytical 
framework to the case of value chain arrangements in Thailand, using data from the “Productivity 
and the Investment Climate Private Enterprise Survey” (PICS), conducted by the World Bank on 
a representative (stratified) sample of 1,385 Thai firms from 2001 to 2003. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews the background literature. Section 3 
develops an integrated approach to the analysis of global value chain relationships and presents 
the main hypotheses. Section 4 illustrates the data and measures used for our empirical tests. 
Section 5 presents the empirical model and discusses the results of our econometric exercises. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Previous literature  
 
A plethora of contributions have focused on vertical relationships as a channel through which 
multinational firms, or more generally “global actors”, transfer technology to local companies. 
For the purpose of the present paper, it is worth recalling some, largely complementary, 
developments which have emerged from two main streams of literature whose convergence 
would in our view generate useful synergies. On the one hand, important insights stem from a 
rather consolidated, albeit variegated, strand of contributions focusing on the economics and 
management of the multinational corporation (MNC) and its key role in the international 
organization of production. We shall refer to this as International Production literature (see Ietto-
Gillies 1992, Cantwell 2000 for extensive reviews of the different schools of thought which can 
be made fall under this heading). On the other hand, recent developments in the Global Value 
Chain literature have focused on more specific types of linkages, namely relationships through 
which global buyers organize their transactions along the value chains on a global scale (See 
Kaplinski and Morris 2001 for a review) and on the importance of these linkages for local 
suppliers’ performance.  
 
With no pretension of an exhaustive survey of the views on linkage creation and technology 
transfer in the very broad international production literature, one can easily single out three main 
approaches which are directly relevant to the scope of this paper.  
 
First, the issue has been tackled in the rather extensive literature on the changing nature of 
multinationals enterprises and their growing involvement in international collaborative ventures. 
While empirical studies on international joint venturing have been proliferating since the mid 
1980’s (see Mowery 1988 for a comprehensive overview of the phenomenon in different 
industries), one may consider the works by Cantwell (1989) and Dunning (1993 and 1995) as 
some of the earliest and most path-breaking in this respect. From a historical perspective Dunning 
(1995) theorized the emergence of what he called “Alliance capitalism”, as a result of the 
globalization of markets and of the changing nature of technology in a number of sectors. These 
forces are considered as fundamental pressures leading to a changing organization of MNCs, 
which increasingly have to resort to linkages with foreign counterparts endowed with 
complementary competencies. Building on these insights and earlier empirical work, several 
studies have explored different aspects of this changing nature of multinationals. These aspects 
range from the role of international alliances in the process of technological diversification and   4
asset seeking strategies  of multinational enterprises (Granstrand et al.1993, Cantwell and 
Piscitello 2000, Narula 2003); to the complementarities between internal networks of subsidiaries 
and external networks of cooperation with local firms and institutions (Zanfei 2000, Castellani 
and Zanfei 2004); to the choice of alternative market entry strategies, including joint ventures and 
contractual agreements with local counterparts (Gomes-Casserses 1989, Hennart and Larimo 
1998, Nisbet et al 2003); to the use of international networks to increase bargaining power of 
multinationals vis à vis national governments, labor forces and other stakeholders (Cowling and 
Sugden 1978, Ietto-Gillies 2002). Although with different emphasis on technology transfer issues, 
these strands of research share the concern about the fact that the boundaries of MNCs are 
changing and getting fuzzier, and this can give rise to increasing voluntary and involuntary 
knowledge flows across countries.   
 
Second, the issue of linkages and knowledge transfer has been at center stage in the rather 
extensive literature on the embeddeness of MNCs. Even though there is a variety of ways in 
which this notion has been conceptualized in the literature (Dacin et al. 1999), there seems to be 
some convergence on the idea that at least three aspects are topical. One of these corresponds to 
the idea that firms may take advantages from “taking roots” in a given context. This can be 
assimilated to a learning process and requires time to take place, hence it is correlated to the 
length of establishment of multinationals in local contexts. A lengthy experience of local contexts 
is expected to favor acquaintance with local norms and codes of conduct, something which may 
help create mutual trust and make transactions more effective (Vaccà 1996, Burchell and 
Wilkisson 1997). A second aspect emphasized in this literature is that  firms become embedded 
by means of extensive webs of transactions with local counterparts, and this will increase access 
to local competencies and eventually evolve into “thicker” relationships involving knowledge 
exchanges (Andersson and Forsgren 1996). A third aspect is adaptation. By adapting to local 
practices, e.g. in the area of human resource management, and by modifying products and 
processes to local requirements, MNCs are able to achieve better performances at the plant level 
and to increase local market penetration (Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994, Andersson et al. 2005). 
Adaptive efforts require knowledge of local contexts, and this is likely to be attained by means of 
(technical) linkages with local firms and institutions.  
 
Third, linkages with local firms are one of the key channels through which MNCs may generate 
knowledge (and pecuniary) spillovers to the host economy. This issue has a long tradition of 
studies dating back to Hirschman (1958) and Lall (1978) and recently revived by Rodriguez-
Clare (1996), Markusen and Venables (1999) and Jarvocik-Smarzynska (2004). Multinational 
firms may enter into a foreign country by setting up plants in upstream industries, where 
intermediate inputs are produced, or in downstream industries, mainly producing final goods. In 
both cases they tend to crowd out domestic competitors, but they are also likely to induce forward 
(in the former case) and backward (in the latter case) linkages, with positive effects on local 
firms. These effects may hinge upon the expansion of demand for local inputs, inducing higher 
efficiency; and on voluntary and involuntary technology transfer from multinationals to local 
suppliers and customers (see Castellani and Zanfei 2006 for a review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on this issue). While an improvement of supplier performances has been 
observed in many developing countries as a result of linkage creation processes (Unctad 2001), 
recent studies report some evidence that there can be positive effects for local firms also when 
multinationals source in advanced countries (Potter, Moore and Spires, 2003, Crone and Roper, 
2001, Veuglers and Cassiman 2004). Some works have stressed the importance of local firms’ 
competencies and absorptive capacity as a necessary condition for spillovers to accrue to the host 
economies (Cantwell 1989, Kokko 1994). Other studies have emphasized that positive spillovers 
are more likely to occur when high local competencies combine with the presence of foreign 
firms that are as close as possible to the technological frontier (Castellani and Zanfei 2006).    5
 
As anticipated earlier in this section, a number of scholars have more recently considered the 
issue of linkage creation and international transmission of knowledge from the “Global value 
chain” (GVC) perspective. The focus in these studies is on how firms active in international 
markets organize the transfer and coordination of complex and strategic information along the  
value chains (Baldwin and Clark 2000; Sturgeon, 2000, 2002; Takeishi and Fujimoto, 2001; 
Langlois, 2003; Sturgeon and Lee, 2005).   
 
With a lesser focus on MNCs, GVC approach analyzes the activities taking place outside the 
firm, and in particular the strategic role of the relationships with key external actors and their 
implications for development.  
Drawing from the transaction cost literature, Gereffi et al. (1990) developed a pioneer framework 
that tied the concept of the value-added chain directly to the global organization of industries. He 
thereafter introduced the notion of “governance” of the Value Chains, defined as “authority and 
power relationships that determine how financial, material, and human resources are allocated 
and flow within a chain” (Gereffi, 1994) This concept is now central in the literature. However, 
recent developments have placed much more emphasis than original contributions on non-
hierarchical governance modes. Among others, Gereffi et. al (2005) have stressed the role of 
inter-firm relationships and of institutional mechanisms through which non-market co-ordination 
of activities in the chain is achieved.  
 
A set of strategic parameters can be highlighted as characterizing governance modes: what is to 
be produced, how it is to be produced, when it is to be produced and how much is to be produced. 
By focusing explicitly on the governance of disintegrated chains, the Global Value Chains 
approach drew attention to the first two critical parameters for value chain governance: what is to 
be produced, and how it is to be produced 
Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) argue that two distinct types of governance should be 
distinguished according to these parameters. On the one hand, there are relationships that bring 
together firms with complementary competences which will jointly set the key parameters. They 
refer to these as "networks", as the term is frequently used to denote some form of co-operation 
between "equals". On the other hand, there are relationships characterized by a marked 
asymmetry of competence and power between the lead firm and subordinate firms within the 
chain. The lead firm often specifies what is to be produced, how it is to be produced and how the 
performance of firms in the chain is to be monitored. Humphrey and Schmitz refer to this form of 
governance as "quasi-hierarchy". 
Global Buyers most often play as “lead firms”, setting these governance parameters in quasi-
hierarchic relationships, especially when they source inputs from developing countries. The form 
and the level of detail at which the buyers specify the parameters may vary substantially across 
countries and sectors. As an example, buyers can provide suppliers with a particular design for 
the producer to work on, they can get involved in their suppliers' quality systems, or even help 
them to introduce particular production processes, effective routines, or monitoring procedures.  
Referring to this phenomenon, Gereffi earlier introduced a distinction between producer-driven 
and buyer-driven global value chains (Gereffi 1994). In the former, the parameters setting is 
undertaken by the producers, defined as the firm which control key product and process 
technologies; while in the latter the key parameters are set by retailers and brand-name firms 
which do not necessarily involve in production facilities. More recently Gereffi (1999b) has also 
pointed out that each of these different types of value chain is associated with different types of 
production systems.  However the idea that there may be heterogeneity in the behaviors of actors 
involved in global value chains, implying different governance modes, has not been fully   6
developed in subsequent literature, particularly when the role of buyers is at stake.
1 Much greater 
attention is given to other aspects affecting the choice of governance modes, including the nature 
of technology and the competencies of suppliers.   
 
The nature of technology is at centre stage in several GVC studies on the electronics sector. 
Focusing on Value Chains and Production Networks, Sturgeon (2002) and Sturgeon and Lee 
(2001) emphasize the complexity of information exchanged between firms and the degree of asset 
specificity in production equipment. They highlight three types of value chain relationships, 
based on the degree of standardization of product and process: (1) the "commodity supplier" that 
provides standard products through arm's length market relationships, (2) the "captive supplier" 
that makes non standard products using machinery dedicated to the buyer's needs, and (3) the 
"turn-key supplier" that produces customized products for buyers, and uses flexible machinery to 
pool capacity for different customers. Hence technical change, affecting the nature and the degree 
of standardization of products and processes, has a significant impact on, and is influenced by,  
the evolution of governance modes in time. 
2  
 
Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2004) go deeper into the analysis of factors affecting 
alternative governance modes. They put forward the idea that there are three key determinants of 
value chain relationships: the complexity of information and knowledge transfer required to 
sustain a particular transaction, especially with respect to product and process specifications; the 
extent to which this information and knowledge can be codified and, therefore, transmitted 
efficiently and without transaction-specific investment between the parties involved in the 
transaction; the capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in relation to the requirements of the 
transaction.  
  
The competencies of suppliers play a key role in the development of governance modes as they 
affect both the ability of local firms to contribute to technical change, and their bargaining power 
vis à vis global buyers. However, the causal relation also goes the other way around, from 
governance modes to firms’ competencies. There is consensus among GVC scholars that the 
governance of the value chain importantly affects the generation, transfer and diffusion of 
knowledge (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000). The link between enterprise upgrading and GVC 
governance has also been made more explicit recently; in a GVC context, upgrading is defined as 
innovating to increase value added (Giuliani, et, al., 2005, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2006).  
 
The GVC perspective is useful for various reasons. First, because the focus moves from 
manufacturing only to the other activities involved in the value chains of goods and services, 
including distribution and marketing. These activities account for increasing shares of GDP 
worldwide. Second, GVC emphasizes the nature of the relationships among the various actors 
involved in the chain, and their implications for development. Moving beyond firm-specific 
analysis and concentrating on inter-firm linkages, it allows to better capture dynamic flows of 
                                                 
1  We shall reconsider this insight in section 3 of this paper. 
2 The concept of governance in the GVC literature is by and large dynamic. Humphrey and Schmitz 
(2002b) underline three factors which may affect the stability and evolution of governance mode:  a) 
power relationships may evolve when existing producers, or their spin-offs, acquire new capabilities; 
b) establishing and maintaining quasi-hierarchical governance is costly for the lead firm and induces 
organizational rigidity because of transaction specific investments and c) firms and clusters often do 
not operate only in one chain but rather simultaneously in several types of chains, therefore they may 
apply competencies learned in one chain to value other chains   7
economic and organizational activities between producers within different sectors even on a 
global scale.
3  
Finally, for the purposes of the present paper, it is important to stress a further advantage of 
adopting this perspective. GVC studies identify distinct types of relationships characterized by a 
different level of involvement of suppliers in knowledge intensive activities. As a result, they help 
explore under which circumstances  value chain agreements can lead to technology dissemination 
and absorption, hence favoring the development of local suppliers. This suggests it may be 
particularly useful to integrate the view of international technology transfer emerged from 
international production literature, as recalled earlier in this section, with the analysis of   value 
chain relationships developed in GVC studies.  
 
 
3. An integrated framework for the analysis of value chains and technology transfer 
 
In this section we integrate and build on the existing literature in three ways. First, we consider  
value chain relationships as a multi-facet process of interaction between buyers and suppliers, 
involving different forms of knowledge transmission and development. Second, we assess 
whether and to what extent  value chain governance is affected by the presence of multinationals 
and by their embeddedness in the host economy. Third, we take into account the capabilities of 
suppliers to handle the technology as a factor influencing technology transfer through  value 
chain relationships. 
 
As regards the first analytical step, we assume that  value chain relationships can be classified 
according to the way suppliers are involved in the adoption, use and co-development of 
technology. On the one hand, this involvement will vary  with the nature of technologies and with 
the capabilities of actors (Von Hippel 1988, Robertson and Langlois 1995). On the other hand, 
the role of suppliers in technology development reflects strategic decisions (the so called 
“parameter setting”) concerning what is to be produced and on how it is to be produced (Gereffi 
1994; Humphrey and Schmitz 2000). 
While all value chain relationships do imply some transmission of information between the 
parties, the extent to which knowledge is actually created, transferred and adopted along the  
value chains varies dramatically. From this perspective, one can characterize at least three 
different types of  value chain agreements. The first is characterized by the transfer of a product 
specification from the purchasing firm to the supplier, and implies that the latter will execute a 
number of tasks on her own which will eventually lead to the provision of the required good (or 
service), following the directions given by the buyer. Under this circumstance, knowledge 
transferred is kept to a minimum, will be mostly codified, and it will flow in one direction only 
(from the buyer to the supplier). A second form of knowledge development and transmission 
takes place when the buyer provides details of the product design and defines precise quality 
standards to be followed in the production process. Knowledge transfer is here much more 
intensive; it might require some knowledge feed-backs from the supplier to ensure that 
procedures are being followed correctly and standards are being met; and part of the knowledge 
needed in this interaction might be tacit in nature. A third typology of  value chain relationship 
can be observed when the buyer disseminates specialized competencies, and involves the supplier 
in R&D and technology development. In this case the amount of knowledge transfer is highest, 
                                                 
3 For example, scrap metal collectors in South Africa are inextricably linked to a global export trade. 
They bring scrap metal in old trolleys directly to shipping agents who pay them London spot prices 
and transfer the scrap immediately to ships for export to iron and steel furnaces across the globe 
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2001).   8
hence we shall refer to these as “knowledge intensive relationships”. One should notice it is not 
only a matter of “quantity” of technology flowing between firms:  a substantial part of the transfer 
takes place through the mobility of personnel and the knowledge involved is thus tacit in nature, 
and flows in both directions, although not necessarily in a balanced way.  
 
These typologies of value chain relationships thus correspond to different modes of organizing 
(international) technology transfer and diffusion. The analysis of the actual impact of value chain 
relationships on the host economy is well beyond the scope of the present paper. However, one 
may suggest that as one proceeds from the first to the third typology illustrated above, value chain 
relationships will be characterized by more and more significant knowledge exchanges between 
global buyers and local suppliers. In the case of LDCs as recipient countries, one may expect that 
the latter governance modes will be associated with a higher degree of technology transfer 
towards local firms.. 
 
The second analytical step anticipated earlier in this section consists in singling out the 
characteristics of global buyers which can be associated with the choice of  value chain 
relationships. As argued earlier in this paper, this aspect has been largely disregarded in GVC 
literature. The only feature of buyers considered in these studies is their “global” nature as this 
implies a greater ability to switch to alternative suppliers in different countries and hence 
accumulate a greater bargaining power. We here argue that other characteristics of global buyers 
do matter, particularly whether and to what extent they are present in the market where suppliers 
are active; and their degree of embeddedness in local contexts. Let us briefly discuss both of these 
factors. 
 
As far as multinational presence is concerned, we expect that global buyers with an extensive 
web of subsidiaries in a given country and sector will have a higher propensity to set up 
knowledge intensive value chain agreements in that country and sector. Hence linkages of the 
third type described earlier will be more likely. In fact, acquaintance with the technical jargon,  
local norms and codes of conduct that are used in a specific context  will reduce the uncertainty 
concerning the behavior of potential partners involved in a given transaction. This will eventually 
pave the way for a greater involvement of local counterparts in collaborative activities.
4 
Moreover, the availability of extensive webs of subsidiaries located in a given market is likely to 
enable MNCs to better monitor alternative suppliers that are active locally. On the one hand, this 
will increase the outside options available to the MNC locally, hence reducing the risk that their 
counterparts behave opportunistically. On the other hand, there will be a greater possibility of 
selecting effective and reliable partners, thus increasing the expected payoff from technology 
transfer. This line of argument can be summarized in the following hypothesis. 
 
H1: Global buyers with a significant presence in the local market are more likely to set up 
knowledge intensive value chain arrangements. 
 
                                                 
4 One may observe that multinational presence will also reduce the “external uncertainty” concerning 
factors that are at least partially beyond the control of individual companies, such as the 
characteristics of local demand, institutions and business  environment. As foreign firms increase 
their presence in a host economy and gather more information on these factors (hence reducing their 
uncertainty) they can be expected to be more prone to commit directly to local activities, possibly 
substituting for local suppliers. While this argument certainly applies when (static) transaction cost 
minimisation is at stake, it seems to be much less the case of technology transfer operations, wherein 
dynamic efficiency considerations are at centre stage. See Castellani and Zanfei (2004) for a 
discussion of this issue.   9
 
However, by emphasizing the importance of an extensive multinational presence we can capture 
only part of the story. The quality of multinational presence also matters. An important qualitative 
aspect of multinational presence is the degree of embeddedness  of affiliates. As recalled in 
section 2, there is still some variety in the way the notion of embeddedness is being 
conceptualized and operationalized in the literature (Dacin 1999). Nevertheless, most writings 
recognize that at least three aspects are involved. The first aspect to be considered is that taking 
roots in the host economy is by and large a function of time. This aspect was clearly illustrated by 
Dunning (1958) in his seminal study on US multinational penetration in the UK after WWII. 
From this perspective, the age of subsidiaries since establishment is a good predictor of 
acquaintance with local contexts, and may be expected to further reduce the behavioral 
uncertainty we have already referred to when talking about mere multinational presence. This 
would thus lead us to conclude that the longer the time since establishment, the greater will be a 
subsidiary’s propensity to get involved in knowledge intensive activities: 
 
H2: The age of subsidiaries since their establishment increases the likelihood of knowledge 
intensive  value chain agreements 
 
   
The second aspect characterizing the concept of embeddedness is the intensity of local sourcing 
of inputs for production. MNCs buying their inputs locally are likely to do so as part of more 
comprehensive  value chain agreements with indigenous firms (Andersson and Forsgren 1996). 
However, this will not necessarily guarantee that significant amounts of technology be transferred 
within these  value chain relationships. When inputs are sourced in LDCs, a high share of 
purchases carried out locally may signal that MNCs are more concerned with cost saving than 
with quality and technology content. Hence we expect that high shares of inputs bought locally be 
associated with  value chain relationships at the lower bound in the knowledge intensity scale: 
 
H3: The higher the share of inputs bought in a context characterized by low level of industrial 
development, the greater the likelihood of arrangements aimed at purchasing low cost goods, and 
the lower the transfer of technology  
 
 
The third feature of embeddedness is adaptation of MNCs to local practices and demand 
conditions (Lane and Lubatkin 1998). Foreign firms may increase their local embeddedness by 
adapting to local procedures, norms of conduct and habits, especially in the field of human 
resource management (Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994). They can also adapt a wider range of 
practices, including their product and process technology and their standard operating procedures, 
as illustrated by Andersson et al. (2005) with reference to about 160 subsidiaries US and 
European multinationals. To the extent that subsidiaries pursue strategies of technology 
adaptation to local demands, one may expect they will set up comprehensive  value chain 
arrangements through which they will exchange substantial amounts of knowledge. That is, 
subsidiaries will be ready to transfer technology in order to have access to adaptation and 
application abilities on a reciprocity basis. Hence our fourth hypothesis: 
 
H4: The higher the efforts to adapt products and processes, the higher the recourse to knowledge 
intensive  value chain relationships 
 
A final step in our analytical framework concerns the competencies of local suppliers and how 
these can be associated with different governance modes. This aspect is emphasized in different   10
streams of literature, including the GVC approach. Here we shall follow more closely the 
technological accumulation tradition within the international production literature (Cantwell 
1989, Kogut and Zander 1993) wherein the importance of absorptive capacity is stressed as a key 
condition favoring interaction between MNCs and local contexts. Following Cohen and Levinthal 
(1989), the idea is that domestic firms will need some competencies not only to handle the 
knowledge they are already endowed with, but also as a means to gain access to external sources 
of technology, including multinationals. From this perspective, value chain agreements are all the 
more likely to be an effective vehicle of knowledge transfer and adoption the greater the technical 
competencies of local suppliers. This for at least two sets of reasons. First, MNCs themselves are 
more likely to be willing to transfer technology to partners that are able to use it effectively 
within the  value chain arrangements, especially when appropriability regimes are well defined 
(Teece 1992) and/or technology is modular enough to allow an effective division of labor along 
the value chains (Gereffi et al 2004).
5 Moreover, dealing with skilled suppliers reduces the risk 
that “residual incompatibilities” arise between the overall product design and the components 
manufactured by local suppliers (Puga and Trefler 2005). Second, the more suppliers are 
endowed with some technical skills, the more they will be interested in entering knowledge 
intensive value chain agreements, because the payoff they can expect to obtain from access to 
external sources of technology will be higher (Cohen and Levinthal 1989).
6 To summarise, a final 
hypothesis can be put forth here: 
 
H5: The higher the technical capabilities of local suppliers the greater the likelihood that  value 
chain  arrangement are knowledge intensive. 
 
 
4. Data and variable specification 
 
4.1 Sample and sources 
This paper uses new firm level data from Thailand to test the five hypotheses presented above. 
The data come from the “Productivity and the Investment Climate Private Enterprise Survey” 
(PICS), conducted by the World Bank on a sample of 1,385 Thai firms in 2004. Surveyed firms 
are active in the following industries: Food Processing, Textile and Clothing, Wooden Furniture 
and Product, Auto parts, Electronics, Rubber and Plastic, Machinery and Equipment. These 
industries account together for more than half of the entire manufacturing value added and of 
manufacturing exports. The regions covered are six: North, North East, Central, Bangkok and 
Vicinity, East and South.   
The Enterprise Surveys sample the universe of registered businesses and follow a stratified 
random sampling methodology.
7 The unit of analysis was the plant and the enumerators 
personally gathered the information. The survey questionnaire called for a variety of qualitative 
and quantitative information. The qualitative section covered issues related to ownership 
structure, technology acquisition, views on the business environment, and relationships with 
banks and other financial institutions. The quantitative section included questions on production, 
financial accounts and human resources.  
                                                 
5 The reverse also applies: researchers have often highlighted that the lack of learning incentives and 
absorptive capacities may represent the reasons for the failure of technology transfer on the part of 
the transferor ( Martin and Salomon, 2003) 
6 In a similar vein, Szulanski (1996) finds that lack of absorptive capacities is a major barrier to 
internal knowledge transfer for eight large U.S. corporations. 
7 For further information: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ICAs.aspx    11
Only registered firms were included in the population frame. The latter has been assembled by the 
national statistical agency with technical assistance from the World Bank, and it was then used to 
randomly choose the sample of small, medium and large establishments to be interviewed.
8  
 
4.2 Why Thailand 
There are several reasons why it is worth using data on Thailand to examine the role of 
multinationals, FDIs and global value chains. 
First, throughout the past decades, Thailand has experienced a rapid growth in private investment, 
both by local firms and by foreign multinationals through FDIs. This country has been a major 
FDI recipient in South-East Asia over the past two decades (Brimble and Sherman, 1999; 
Mephokee, 2002). As a matter of fact, in 2004, the Global Investment Prospects Assessment 
(GIPA) of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) designed to 
analyze “future patterns of FDI flows at global, regional, national, and industry levels”, has 
ranked Thailand as one of the four “top hot spots for FDI” in the world over the next four years, 
preceded only by China, India, and the United States. Thailand is ranked as the “Top 3” most 
attractive country for FDI flows in two separate categories - “Asia” and “Developing Economies” 
- listed only behind only China and India. 
Second, until the late 1970s, FDI was dominant in import-substitution industries such as textiles, 
automobiles, and chemicals. From then on, an increasing share of FDI was directed to more 
export-oriented activities. Export-oriented FDI initially came to light in manufacturing industries 
such as clothing, textiles, footwear and toys. More recently, labor intensive assembly activities in 
electronics and electrical goods industries have been the main attraction to foreign investors. The 
shift in the composition of FDI from domestic-market oriented production to export oriented 
production has closely mirrored the shift in the domestic trade policy regime and the very 
favorable approach of the Thai government towards FDI 
Third, Thailand has experienced impressively high rates of real GDP growth over most of the past 
40 years. These positive achievements may partly be attributed to the successful transformation of 
the economic structure from agriculture to manufacturing. The share of agriculture in gross 
domestic product (GDP) declined from about 40 per cent in the 1960s to about 10 per cent in the 
1990s, even though the contribution of agriculture to the economy grew steadily by more than 2.5 
per cent annually between 1965 and 1996. However, the rapid expansion of the manufacturing 
sector overshadowed the growth in agriculture (Intarakumnerd et al., 2002). Manufacturing in 
Thailand has grown in importance over the last 25 years, and its share in GDP has grown also in 
the investment slump phase that hit Asian economies in more recent years. The sector is now 
approaching two fifths of GDP, compared to one third of GDP before the Asian crisis and just 
over one fifths of GDP in the early 1980s. In spite of this high growth of manufacturing activities, 
Thailand still exhibits a relatively low technological profile
9, which makes it particularly 
important for its firms to get involved in knowledge intensive relationships with foreign firms.  
                                                 
8 We performed various tests to check missing values, zero sales, zero employment, and observations 
failing to satisfy other basic error checks. 
9 Thai firms’ USPTO patenting has been almost null between 1980 and 1996 and has thereafter 
grown very gradually to reach an average level of approximately 20 patents per year in the subsequent 
decade. In the same period China and India have experienced a gradual growth of inventive activity 
until the mid 90’s and thereafter the number of patents with at least one inventor resident in one of 
the two countries has accelerated dramatically and exhibited an average increase of up to 75% per 
year (Puga and Trefler 2005) .   12
 
4.3 Variable Description 
As this paper focuses on  value chain relationships occurring between buyers and local suppliers, 
we consider two categories of firms: foreign owned firms (FOR) and domestic firms (DOM). The 
former category includes firms in which the share of subscribed capital owned by foreign 
investors is equal to at least 30 percent 
10 and the main shareholder is represented by a 
Multinational Company, while the latter refers to firms which are national owned.
11 About 24 
percent of firms in the sample meets the former definition (FOR), whereas more than 50 percent  
(717 active firms) meets the latter (DOM)
12. FOR firms buy their inputs in the local market and 
export the most of their production abroad, and DOM firms sell more than 50% of their output in 
the domestic market.     
The distribution of firms is quite uneven across industries in our sample. The presence of FOR 
firms is concentrated in Electronics and Automotive parts, characterized by high levels of 
research and development, and a large share of professional and technical workers, and in Textile 
and Clothing. DOM firms are concentrated heavily in Textile and Clothing too and in Rubber and 
Plastics industry FOR firms are generally larger than domestic firms. See Appendix 1 for 
descriptive statistics on these categories of firms. 
 
The next step is to build our measure of  value chain governance which will represent the 
dependent variable in our econometric exercise. To this aim, we take into account the theoretical 
framework developed in Section 3, on the one hand, and peculiarities of the Thai production 
system, on the other hand. We define a measure of  value chain governance based on the 
following variables: 
 
a) percentage of sales made by suppliers exclusively to suit buyer’s specification;  
b) whether the buyer provided information on Design/Quality (i.e. product characteristics) and 
imposed product quality standards; 
c) whether the buyer engaged the supplier in process or product R&D type of activities; 
d) whether the buyer sent employees to (or organized personnel exchanges with) suppliers as a 
means to disseminate and diffuse new technologies into the local firms’ production facilities. 
 
Consistent with our discussion in section 3, we identify three basic types of  value chain 
governance characterized by different combinations of the key variables above(Table 1). GOV0 
reflects a situation where less than 30 percent of total sales are made to meet the client’s unique 
specification, and suppliers do not receive further inputs from the buyers; GOV1 type reflects a 
situation where the buyer is responsible for more than 30% of the supplier’s total sales, and the 
client not only transfers a product specification but also provides details on the product design 
and intervenes to ensure that quality standards are met; finally GOV2 occurs when captive sales 
are higher than 30% and together with product specification, design and quality standards, the 
buyer disseminates technology and R&D activities. 
                                                 
10 OECD and UNCTAD use a benchmark of 10% as threshold level. Other benchmarks taken by other 
researches include Sjoholm (1997) who considers a 15% threshold of equity owned by foreigners, Haddad and 
Harrison (1993) considered foreign firms as those with at least 5 % equity owned by foreigners, Djankov and 
Hoekman (1998) had a benchmark of 20%, while Castellani and Zanfei (2006) considered foreign firms as 
those with at least 50 % equity owned by foreigners 
11 Using information about firms’ ownership, whether firms have affiliates and/or separate operating facilities 
outside Thailand, and whether they have holdings or operations in other countries, we can reasonably state that 
the sample of domestic firms (DOM) does not contain any Thai (domestic) multinationals. 
12 To avoid ambiguity in the analysis, we do not consider firms which are national owned and export more than 
50% of their output. These firms represent about 25 percent of firms in the sample.   13
 
 
Table 1 – Classification of Value Chain Governance 
 
 
Types of Value 
Chain Governance 











and process and 
product R&D 
 GOV0  
 
Less than 30%  No  No 
GOV1  
 
More than 30%  Yes  No 
GOV2  
 
More than 30%  Yes  Yes 
 
 
Hence, our dependent variable GOVij takes value equal to 0 (GOV0) if captive sales of local firm 
i active in sector j represent a relatively low share of its total sales, no transfer of information 
occurs concerning design and quality standards, and there is no involvement in technology and 
R&D activities; equal to 1 (GOV1) if there is a high share of captive sales, a transfer of design 
and quality standards, but no involvement in technology and R&D; and equal to 2 (GOV2) if 
there is a high share of captive sales, a transfer of design and quality standards, and a direct 
involvement in technology and R&D activities. It is worth noting that the three governance types 
are characterized inter alia by a different involvement of suppliers in technology development, 
and by distinct degrees of knowledge transfer from multinationals to local firms. We shall 
accordingly refer to GOV2 as “knowledge intensive” value chain relationships to emphasize this 
aspect. See Appendix 1 for descriptive statistics on the distribution of these governance types 
across industries and firms. 
 
We focus on a set of sector and firm specific characteristics which can be expected to be 
associated  with these governance types. GOVij will be regressed on different  measures of 
multinational presence, of the degree of embeddedness of foreign buyers in the host economy 
(Thailand), and (firm level) measures of the competencies of local suppliers. A vector Z of 
controls for firm size, year, region and macro-sector
13 is also introduced in all regressions. The 
equation to be estimated will thus be of the following type: 
 
GOVij=f(SUBj, AGEj, LSUPj, ADAPTj, DOMTECHij, DOMPATij, Zij) 
 
                                                 
13 According to World Bank’s ICA (Investment Climate Assessment) criteria based on OECD 
classification by technological intensity,we aggregated our 7 industries into four macro-sectors: High tech: 
electronics; Medium high tech: machinery; automotive parts; Medium low tech: rubber and plastics; 
Low tech: textile and clothing; food processing, wood   14
 The functional form used for the empirical test will be discussed in section 5 below. Independent 
variables are defined as follows: 
 
- Multinational presence 
We computed two measures of the presence of multinationals. The foreign presence ratio (SUBj) 
as the share of foreign subsidiaries out of the total number of firms active in sector j; the 
subsidiaries workers ratio (SUBwksj) as the share of subsidiaries workers out of the total number 
of workers in sector j. As discussed in section 3, we expect the extent of foreign presence in the 
market to reduce behavioral uncertainty of MNCs and to increase the likelihood that effective 
suppliers are eventually selected, hence facilitating  the recourse to GOV2. (see H1 in section 3).  
 
 
- Multinational embeddedness 
As discussed in section 3, multinational embeddedness is a multi-facet concept which can be 
captured by different variables. We suggest to use the following proxies. 
AGEj: this is calculated as a weighted sum of subsidiaries, where the weights are given by the 
years that each subsidiary has been active in sector j in Thailand. A similar measure has been 
used also in Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) and Castellani and Zanfei (2004), and takes into 
account the length of time that foreign firms has been operating in a given market. This is 
expected to reinforce the impact of multinational presence and to affect positively the choice of 
GOV2 (see H2 in section 3). 
LSUPj: this indicates the log of the amount of inputs bought locally by multinational subsidiaries 
in sector j. LSUP captures how extensive are the market relationships of MNCs subsidiaries with 
local firms, as an indicator of embeddedness. The existing literature emphasises that MNCs can 
obtain significant performance advantages from an extension of their relationships with local 
firms (Andersson 2005). For the purposes of the present analysis we suggest that, especially in 
the case of relationships with suppliers in LDCs, a mere increase in the share of inputs purchased 
locally is likely to indicate mainly an effort to obtain cost savings through value relationships. We 
thus expect this measure to impact positively on GOV0 and negatively on GOV2 (see H3 in 
section 3). 
ADAPTj: this measure identifies whether product and process technology are adapted by MNCs 
active in sector j to local requirements. For this purpose, we use a dummy variable which takes 
value one when foreign firms adapt their technology to suit local conditions, and zero otherwise. 
As discussed in section 3, we expect this indicator to be associated with intensive exchanges of 
knowledge between MNCs, which value design, R&D and skills, and suppliers which co-develop 
the technology helping to adapt it to the local context. Hence we expect this variable to impact 
positively on GOV2 (see H4 in section 3). 
 
- Domestic firms’ capacity “to handle the technology”  
This capacity is proxied by two variables referred to domestic (Thai) firms only.  DOMPATij is a 
dummy variables which takes value 1 if the the domestic supplier i active in sector j  has filed a 
patent in the last 3 years and 0 otherwise; while DOMTECH ij takes value 1 if domestic firm i 
active in sector j develops the technology within the establishment locally and 0 otherwise. These 
measures capture domestic firms’ absorptive capacity and can be expected to be positively 
correlated to GOV2 (see H5 in section3).  
 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
 
5.1 Empirical model 
   15
We use a multinomial logit model approach to investigate the correlation between value chain 
governance modes and the characteristics of firms and sectors in Thailand.  Since GOV0, GOV2 
and GOV3 represent qualitatively different modes of organizing technology transfer, which may 
each be influenced by different combinations of explanatory variables, a multinomial logit 
model is the most suitable for this analysis. We estimated the multinomial logit model by 
maximum likelihood method.  
 
We consider a vector of explanatory variablesto examine the relationship between these variables 
and the y-th alternative in terms of governance levels. The vector contains the set of independent 
variables defined in section 4 above: the ratio of foreign subsidiaries of MNCs to total firms 
active in sector j (SUBj)
14, the average age of subsidiariesin sector j (AGE j), the share of inputs 
they buy locally (LSUPj), whether they adapt the technology to suit local conditions (ADAPTj); 
and the technological capabilities of domestic firms involved in the relationship (DOMTECHij 
and DOMPATij).
15 As mentioned earlier, controls for year, industry, region and size are also 
included in this vector. 
 
Following Greene (1997), we define a multi-category variable (y) as dependent variable. Let x be 
the vector of explanatory variables, the multinomial logit model response probability takes the 
following form: 
 





k nk n r x x P k y P β β ∑
=
+ = = =          for k=0, 1, …K 
(1.1) 
 
where Pnk is the probability that the dependent variable (Yn) takes value k at nth observation, 
with  k ranging from 0 to K. In our case k will take values 0, 1 or 2 to identify three different 
governance modes: GOV0 (k = 0), GOV1 (k = 1) and GOV2 (k = 2).  
 
It should be mentioned that the point estimates of a multinomial logit tell us, for each choice k, 
the change in probability of the outcome k, relative to the baseline outcome (k = 0), induced by a 
unit change in the explanatory variables. In a multinomial framework, this does not assure that 
the absolute probability of outcome k will increase or decrease, but that k will be more or less 
likely relative to baseline outcome. As we are interested in the change in absolute probability of 
the outcome k induced by the regressors, we shall calculate the marginal effect: 
 
                                                 
14 We show only the results with foreign presence ratio expressed in terms of the number of foreign 
firms as a share of the total number of firms in sector j. We also tested the alternative measure 
expressed in terms of the number of workers, both separately and jointly with the other explanatory 
variables, with no significant diversities in results. The outcomse of regressions using alternative 
specifications are available from the authors upon request. 
15  We use interaction terms to econometrically capture the additional effect of the variables 
considered when referred to domestic firms. Moreover, we test for multicollinearity and we run 
separated regression for each of the variables in the vector.  










Estimation of the multinomial logit model is based on the assumption that probabilities of the 
alternative choices are independent of each other. This property is called the independence from 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The validity of this assumption is checked using the test introduced 
by Small and Hsiao (1985) (see Appendix 2). 
Outcomes are presented in terms of marginal effects (table 2). Small and Hsiao test results 
(Appendix 2) support the IIA assumption. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
5.2 Discussion of results 
 
- Multinational presence (SUB). 
 
As foreshadowed by the marginal effect reported in Table 2, the estimated coefficients on the 
variables used to identify Multinational presence suggest that a greater presence of SUB in the 
market increases the likelihood of observing types of governance featured by suppliers’ 
involvement in technology and R&D activities (GOV2).The evidence is thus broadly consistent 
with the hypothesis H1 (section 3) that the extent of the presence of global buyers in the local 
market reduces behavioral uncertainty and increases the likelihood of success in the selection of 
partners, both conditions favoring the development of knowledge intensive value chain 
agreements.  
 
- Multinational embeddedness 
 
The three measures of embeddedness used in this paper appear to have a different impact on the 
governance of value chain relationships.  
As far as the length of time (AGE) is concerned, our findings reveal that an extensive and long 
lasting presence in the country is not significant for the three aspects of value chain governance 
considered in the analysis (Table 2). These results do not appear to be in line with hypothesis H2, 
according to which the age of subsidiaries increases the likelihood of knowledge intensive value 
chain agreements. This outcome might have to do with the specificity of the Thai case. A possible 
explanation is that MNCs which have a long experience of this market got to know more 
weaknesses than strengths as far as manufacturing and technology management abilities of local 
firms. This is broadly consistent with the evidence briefly recalled above (section 4) and 
produced  inter alia by Puga and Trefler (2005), who show that Thai firms exhibited a very 
limited increase of the patents filed to the USPTO in 1980-2004, as opposed to other Asian 
countries characterized by much higher growth of inventive activity, such as China and India. 
Over time, MNCs active in Thailand may thus have experienced lower innovative performances 
than expected and this might have a negative impact on the decision to get involved in joint 
development of technology with local suppliers.  
 
When we turn to another measure of embeddedness, namely the share of inputs bought locally 
(LSUP), we find a positive correlation with GOV0 and a negative correlation with GOV2 (Table 
2). In other words, the more MNCs buy inputs locally the higher the likelihood of  value chain 
relationships characterized by a very limited transfer of knowledge. These findings seem to 
support the hypothesis H3 (section 3): it is most likely that MNCs purchasing a high share of their   17
inputs in Thailand will do so above all to obtain significant cost savings. This priority is exactly 
opposite to the one that is normally pursued when value chain relationships are used to co-
develop technology with local firms. While using local purchases to reduce costs seems to be a 
rather general rule when MNCs source their inputs in LDCs, this could be particularly the case of 
Thailand, as local input manufacturers might well be less dynamic than in other Asian countries. 
  
Finally, the efforts of MNCs to adapt products and processes (ADAPT) appear to impact 
positively on GOV2. In other words, when MNCs are so “embedded” in local contexts that they 
invest in the adaptation of products and processes, value chain relationships are more likely to be 
knowledge intensive.
 16 Under these circumstances, the arrangements with local suppliers will not 
only imply high shares of captive sales, but also significant transfers of knowledge concerning 
product specification, design and quality standards, and a substantial dissemination of technology 
and R&D activities (Table 2). These results are thus consistent with hypothesis H4 as discussed in 
section 3. 
 
- Domestic firms’ capacity “to handle the technology” 
 
It is apparent from table 2 that when suppliers have the capacity “to handle the technology”,  
value chain relationships are more likely to be characterized by transfer of design, quality 
standards and technology (GOV2). This result is robust to changes in the measure used to capture 
domestic firms’ technical competencies, that is both dummies used for this purpose (whether 
domestic firms have filed patents, DOMPAT, or develop technology intra-muros, DOMTECH) 
have a positive impact on GOV2. Even more important, these variables remain significant also 
when controlling for the presence of multinational firms (SUB), suggesting that domestic 
competencies have a positive impact on knowledge intensive  value chain relationships for any 
given level of foreign presence. Consistently with hypothesis H5, it thus appears that if local 
suppliers have the capacity to develop the technology within their establishments,  value chain 
arrangement will likely be knowledge intensive. This result mirrors the correlation we found 
between GOV2 and ADAPT. The positive impact of ADAPT on GOV2 can be interpreted as a 
signal that the effort of MNCs to adapt technology requires governance modes through which 
some knowledge exchange occurs, and hence applications abilities can be more easily supplied by 
local firms. Quite symmetrically, the positive impact of DOMTECH (or DOMPAT) on GOV2 
suggests that global buyers may be induced to set up knowledge intensive relationships with 




In this paper we have attempted to combine insights from international production literature and 
from the recent “Global value chain” approach to develop a more comprehensive framework for 
the analysis of technology transfer via value chain relationships. It is suggested that the 
characteristics of both foreign and domestic firms affect the development of alternative modes of 
organizing  value chain relationships between multinationals and local firms. 
Our study has made an effort to integrate the existing literature in three ways. First, we have 
considered  value chain relationships as a multi-facet process of interaction between buyers and 
suppliers, involving different degrees of knowledge transmission and development. Second, we 
                                                 
16 It is worth noting that more than 60% of SUB firms in our sample adapt their technology to suit 
local conditions. This helps explain why the share of GOV2 is rather high as a whole. See Appendix 
1, table 2. However, the negative impact of AGE discussed in the text may signal that the share of 
GOV2 may be decreasing over time.   18
have assessed whether and to what extent  value chain governance is affected by the presence of 
multinationals and by their embeddedness in the host economy. Third, we have taken into account 
the capabilities of suppliers to handle the technology as a factor influencing technology transfer 
through  value chain relationships. 
 
Using data on a representative sample of 1,385 Thai firms, we have applied a multinomial logit 
model to test whether and to what extent governance modes are influenced by multinational 
presence, by the degree of embeddedness of foreign buyers in the host economy (Thailand), and 
by the competencies of local suppliers. The available data  allow us to carry out only a cross-
section analysis which highlights simple correlations and no causal links between variables. 
Moreover, correlations are not always straightforward in the analysis. Nevertheless, knowledge 
intensive governance modes, that are characterized by a greater transmission of technology along 
the  value chains, appear to be positively associated with the presence of global buyers in the 
local market, with the efforts of MNCs to adapt technology to local contexts, and with the 
competencies of domestic suppliers. These results are consistent with a view of technology 
transfer as a process that requires some proximity of MNCs to suppliers, and the local availability 
of technical capacities. Technology transfer is also facilitated when the degree of embeddedness 
of MNCs is high enough to induce affiliates to modify their products and processes to local 
demands. By contrast, the age of subsidiaries and the share of inputs purchased locally appears to 
be associated with value chain relationships with a lower technological profile. A high share of 
inputs purchased in a Less Developed Country may reflect a cost saving approach, in contrast 
with a strategy based on knowledge intensive  value chain relationships. The negative impact of  
the age of subsidiaries may reflect that foreign buyers with a long experience of the Thai market 
have learned that local suppliers are not competent enough to make technology transfer 
worthwhile.  
 
A deeper interpretation of these results calls for further research on the evolution of market 
structure in the Thai economy and on the actual behavior of MNCs active in that market, and 
possibly comparative works on different recipient economies. It remains that the empirical results 
obtained in this study induce some reflections on the role of embeddedness of MNCs as a factor 
conducive to technology transfer and local development. In fact, it appears that it is not enough 
that MNCs have an extensive and lasting presence in a country to favor the creation of knowledge 
intensive relationships with local firms; nor is it enough that foreign firms get involved in 
massive market transactions with local firms, if these concern low cost and low value added 
goods. What seems crucial to make value chain relationships evolve and become fundamental 
vehicles for technology transfer is a combination of efforts by both domestic and foreign firms, 
aimed at increasing local competencies, on the one hand, and at adapting technology to host 
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Table 2 - Firms’ characteristics and value chain governance  
 
         
Multinomial logit regression   GOV = 0  GOV = 1  GOV = 2
   dy/dx  dy/dx  dy/dx
SUB -0.17 -0.28 0.39
   (-4.58) (-2.29) (3.79)
AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00
   (2.19) (-1.46) (0.076)
LSUP 0.04 0.04 -0.08
   (2.39) (1.24) (-2.48)
ADAPT -0.14 0.03 0.29
   (-1.64) (3.15) (3.15)
dompat*   0.06 -0.12 0.09
   (2.56) (-4.89) (2.38)
domtech*   0.05 -0.12 0.05
   (2.87) (-4.27) (2.97)
Industries included  included  included
Regions dummies  included  included  included
Size   included  included  included
  
Observations 717 717 717
Source PICS, authors' own 
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APPENDIX 1 – Descriptive statistics on sample firms 
 
 
A.1- Distribution of firms across 
industries (%)       
      
   FOR DOM
      
Textile and Clothing  17.8 26.1




Rubber and Plastics  9.0 23.1
Automotive Parts  17.1 11.6
      
A.2- Size distribution of firms in 
the sample (%)       
      
   FOR DOM
      
Small (less than 50 workers)  10.9 36.1
Medium (50 to 150 workers)  21.4 34.3
Large (more than 150 workers)  67.7 29.6
Total 100  100 
Source: authors' own 




A.3 - Governance type distribution 
across industries (%)  GOV 0  GOV 1  GOV 2  Total 
            
Textile and Clothing  9.04 48.59 42.37 100 
Food Processing  10.61 34.64 54.75 100 
Machinery  11.3 40.11 48.02 100 
Electronics  10.84 33.13 53.61 100 
Wood  15.2 48.8 35.2 100 
Rubber and Plastics  9.62 41.84 47.7 100 
Automotive Parts  7.59 40.69 51.03 100 
            
Pearson chi2 (6)=  16.2409 55.1731 54.8764   
Pr=  0.013 0.000 0.000   
Source: authors' own computation 
on PICS data   





A.4 - Domestic firms Governance 
type distribution across industries 
(%)  GOV 0  GOV 1  GOV 2  Total 
            
Textile and Clothing  13.9 47.8 38.5 100 
Food Processing  12.8 41.0 46.2 100 
Machinery  12.6 41.4 45.9 100 
Electronics  25.4 41.8 32.7 100 
Wood  22.0 49.3 28.6 100 
Rubber and Plastics  13.3 38.8 47.7 100 
Automotive Parts  7.2 38.5 54.2 100 
ALL INDUSTRIES  14.1 42.9 42.5  100 
   
Source: authors' own computation        
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APPENDIX 2 - Small –Hsiao test to assess the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA) Assumption 
 
The Small-Hsiao test is a modified version of the McFadden-Train-Tye likelihood ratio 
test.  Following Small and Hsiao (1985), we can divide the sample randomly into two 
subsets of about equal size. The unrestricted model is estimated for both subsets where 
1 ˆ S
u β  
refers to estimates of the unrestricted model on the first subset, and 
2 ˆ S
u β  is its counterpart for the 
second subset. A weighted average of the coefficients is computed as follows: 





u β β β − + =  
After this, a restricted sample is created using the second sub-sample by eliminating all outcomes 
with a chosen value of the dependent variable. The model is the estimated using the restricted 
sample with 
2 ˆ S
r β referring to the estimated coefficients and  ) ˆ (
2 S
r L β indicating the likelihood. 
Finally, the following test statistic is used which is asymptotically distributed with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of independent variables plus one 
} ˆ ( ) ˆ ( { 2
) 2 2 1 S
r
S S
u L L SH β β − − =  
 
(1) Small –Hsiao test results (I specification with  SUBwksj) 
Omitted lnL(full) lnL(omit)  chi2 df P>chi2 evidence
         
1 
-
1244.71 -1240.79 7.84 9 0.55 for Ho
2 
-
556.623 -553.439 6.367 9 0.703 for Ho
0 
-
545.925 -542.333 7.184 9 0.618 for Ho
 
(2) Small –Hsiao test results (II specification with  SUBj) 
Omitted lnL(full) lnL(omit)  chi2 df P>chi2 evidence
         
1 
-
1279.46 -1277.9 3.129 9 0.959 for Ho
2 
-
572.716 -571.29 2.853 9 0.97 for Ho
0 
-
557.163 -555.939 2.448 9 0.982 for Ho
 
(3) Small –Hsiao test results (III specification vector  SUBj;AGEj;LSUPj;ADAPTj;DOMTECHij 
and DOMPATij ) 
Omitted lnL(full)  lnL(omit) chi2 df  P>chi2  evidence
            
1 -524.465  -516.831 15.268 16 0.505  for  Ho
2 -518.801  -512.755 12.093 16 0.738  for  Ho
0 -1180.186  -1176.825 6.722 16 0.978  for  Ho
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